上游企业感谢信

上游企业感谢信（精选7篇）

1.上游企业感谢信 篇一

骨干企业在发展珠江上游循环经济中的作用

骨干企业是推行循环经济的主体力量,发挥骨干企业的`作用是珠江上游地区发展循环经济的必然选择.珠江上游地区的骨干企业在推行循环经济过程中具有促进资源开发与利用方式转变、推动各类企业间的联系与协作、推动企业开展清洁生产等作用形式.充分发挥骨干企业在珠江上游地区循环经济中的作用必须推进其绿色制度创新.

作 者：朱谷生 Zhu Gusheng 作者单位：曲靖师范学院,经济与政治法律系,云南,曲靖,655011刊 名：曲靖师范学院学报英文刊名：JOURNAL OF QUJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY年，卷(期)：25(2)分类号：F279.726.4关键词：珠江上游 骨干企业 循环经济 资源利用 生态保护

2.上游企业感谢信 篇二

一、上游成本会计的含义

所谓“上游成本会计”, 是指在价值链管理环境下, 以保持和赢得竞争优势为目标, 在保证顾客满意的条件下, 通过特定的定性及定量的成本方法, 选择良好的供应商合作伙伴, 从成本角度维系和管理供应商关系, 以优化企业进货成本结构、降低进货成本的成本会计。可见, 根据价值链管理思想, 基于价值链管理的上游成本会计主要是针对企业价值链上游, 即企业外部供应商进行成本管理, 其主要工作内容即为针对企业价值链上游的供应商进行成本管理, 包括根据成本信息选择、评价良好的供应商合作伙伴、供应商关系管理, 以及在价值链起始的设计阶段对供应商的成本管理等内容。

二、基于作业成本法的企业上游成本会计模型

在价值链管理环境下, 企业首要任务之一就是要选择良好的供应商合作伙伴, 这也是上游成本会计所需从事的重要工作之一, 即利用成本管理方法, 建立一套科学合理的供应商选择评价模型, 并用于实践工作。上游成本会计应该能够从成本的视角对供应商进行选择评价。综合考察现有的成本方法, 笔者认为, 作业成本法能够在供应商选择评价中发挥重要作用, 上游成本会计可以运用作业成本方法, 建立价值链管理环境下基于作业成本法的供应商选择评价模型。

作业成本法将成本管理从以“产品”为中心转移到以“作业”为中心, 成本对象不再局限于单一的“产品”层次, 而是可以根据不同的管理目的定义不同类型和不同层次的成本对象。其意义不仅在于成本计算的精确性的层面, 而且己经深入到了企业作业链—价值链重构, 乃至企业组织结构设计的问题。因此, 利用作业成本法不仅能够计算出与特定供应商相关的作业成本以进行供应商的选择评价, 而且能够在作业成本法的基础上对这些作业进行优化, 最终起到优化价值链的作用。运用作业成本法进行供应商选择评价的基本公式如下:

其中:Si表示由供应商i所引起的每单位购进货物所包含的战略性供应商成本;CSSi表示由供应商i所引起的整个计划合作期内的战略性供应商成本;Pi表示供应商i提供物资的单位净价;Q表示采购企业在整个计划合作期内将要购买的货物数量;C j表示采购企业成本动因J的成本动因率;Dij表示由供应商i引起的采购企业成本动因J的估计数量。

对作业进行适当的划分, 一是便于企业识别作业及其成本动因, 提高计算的准确性;二是有利于企业找出不必要、不增值或低效率的作业, 进行作业的优化设计。其次, 有人可能要问:公式中为什么要用Q去“除”CSSi呢?就供应商选择决策本身来说, “除”与“不除”并没有实质性的区别。但是, 这却涉及到一个成本管理理念的问题。一般来说, C S S在整个合作期间并不是均匀发生的, 往往初期比较大、中后期比较小, 因为随着企业与供应商“相处”时间的延长, 相互信任程度会加深、协作的效率也会提高。但是从逻辑上讲, 后期购进的物资应该要“帮助”前期购进的物资分担一部分成本, 因为前期交易为后期交易打下了基础。而且, “除”了以后还有其现实意义:便于企业计算出每单位的产成品中包含了多少CSS (单位产成品中包含的, 这样不仅有利于企业实施产品成本控制, 而且有利于企业进行产品定价决策。因为前期购进物资“高”成本可能会导致前期生产的产成品具有“高”成本的假象 (企业也有可能因此将产成品的价格定得偏高) , 而到后期发现产品成本“降低”了, 很可能误以为这是企业“努力”的结果, 从而掩盖了成本控制的真实效果。

根据企业的发展战略、长期销售预测及产品的物料清单等文件, 确定购进的关键物资、预测计划合作期内的购进数量;收集该关键物资的市场情报, 确定各备选的供应商 (这些备选的供应商应该具备长期合作的意愿, 其产品结构、技术等条件应该符合企业的基本要求, 否则计算其战略性供应商成本是没有任何意义的) ;确定各供应商提供的单位净价;从企业的A B C综合数据库中提取数据, 识别和划分出与供应商相关的作业;通过作业和成本动因分析查看作业是否需要优化, 如有需要则对相关的作业进行优化设计, 优化完毕, 将作业优化的结果返回到ABC综合数据库中更新相关的数据, 并确定每一作业 (经优化的) 的成本动因率和各供应商引起的成本动因数量;运用公式计算出S;以S为标准并结合其他方面的考虑选出供应商, 并确定供应商关系。理论上, 如果各备选供应商在其他方面的情况差不多或不能确定时, 应选择S最小的供应商作为供应链合作伙伴。

在选择了良好的供应商合作伙伴之后, 上游成本会计要展开各项工作, 加强与供应商之间的沟通, 科学地管理供应商成本, 优化采购成本。上游成本会计需要与供应商一起寻找提高企业与供应商之间“互赢”的途径和方法。价值链上游成本会计应该与供应商共同寻找提高相互交流效率的途径。提高相互交流效率的一个重要方面就是降低不确定性, 例如, 通过提高信息共享和缩短周期来降低不确定性。通过对供应商的管理, 企业可使得供应商能够通过改变自身行为来降低采购成本, 从而提高供应商与企业相互交流的效率。例如, 如果企业采用适时生产制度 (Just In Time) 方式, 供应商延迟交货的代价就十分高昂。在对采购成本进行分析的基础上, 企业可以向供应商展示由交货能力低所导致的高成本。然后, 供应商可以启动一个项目专门提高及时交货的能力。企业可以通过将自己在价值链管理过程中所掌握的经验传授给供应商, 从而在这一过程中对供应商起到协助作用。

参考文献

[1]黄大春刘秋生:价值链管理环境下基于作业成本法的供应商选择评价模型.财会周刊, 2005年第8期

3.中药企业:往上游去 篇三

中医作为中国传统文化中的重要分支，曾主宰了数千年的疾病治疗历史。然而，受现代科学观念的影响，传统中医已渐趋没落，陷入发展窘境。国际中成药市场基本被日、韩、美、德等国家所垄断，而中国企业则多停留在药材出口的初级阶段，既有的中成药企业也呈现多、小、散的状态。

不过，近年来中药材价格的暴涨行情以及国家政策的大力扶持，促使中药制药企业为了自身的发展需要，开始布局产业链上游。与中国制造的许多企业一样，中药制药企业也走上了谋求产品高附加值的征程。

行业整体呈现多、小、散状态

拥有悠久历史的中医，在中国拥有一批庞大、固定的追随者，从而形成一个稳定的消费群体，即便是在西药的不断冲击之下，中药消费依然保持持续快速增长。据统计，中成药工业产值从1978年的8亿元增加到2008年的1400多亿元，而近5年我国的中药消费市场平均增速达25.29%。尤其是2009年1月-11月，中成药制造行业实现主营业务收入1698.9亿元，同比增长22.89%；同期的中药饮片加工行业也实现了430.7亿元的主营业务收入，同比增长25.57%。

受中药行业高利润、高增长等利好因素吸引，大量资金流向了中药行业，加快了中药市场发展的步伐，不过也暴露出严重的盲目投资和重复建设等问题。据国家食品药品监督管理局的统计数据显示，2008年中国共有4110家中药企业，其中中成药生产企业886家，生产中药饮片的1194家，而既生产化学药又生产中成药的有2030家。在这4110家企业中，67%的企业收入低于5000万，没有一家企业占有垄断性的市场地位，数千家企业中市场规模超过10亿元的寥寥无几。整个中国中药企业呈现多、小、散的状态，产业集中度低、低水平重复、规模小、创新不足等问题非常明显。

海外企业垄断国际中成药市场

另一方面，早在上世纪80年代，海外跨国制药企业就开始加强对中药的投入力度，纷纷设立研究机构，通过各种途径搜集中国的经典古方、药方，拿回本国研究开发，然后申请专利并制造成中成药或保健品。目前世界医药20强的企业都专门设立了中草药研究中心，国际中药市场更是满天的“洋中药”飞扬，日本等外国企业学习得到的“汉方”成为当前最主流的“中药”。真正属于国内企业生产的中成药在国际市场上微乎其微，国内中成药出口量最大的同仁堂海外市场销售额也仅为1.7576亿元，在全球过千亿元的中成药市场中显得微不足道。

反观深受中国文化影响的日本，则走在了中药研发的前列。中药在日本被称为“汉方药”，全日本超过200家汉方药厂既覆盖了中药材基地，也包括了中药饮片加工厂。作为中国中药材最大的消费市场，2009年，日本80%的中药原料材料进口自中国，总额达1.05亿美元。日本的汉方药厂将这些从中国廉价购买的中药材加工成中成药，再转销中国或国际市场，从中赚取高额的商品附加值。除了日本以外，韩、美、德等国家也凭借技术优势，将中国的出口药材加工成高附加值的成品药，再以高价返销中国市场，基本垄断了国际中成药市场。

药材价格暴涨挤压企业利润空间

2008年经济危机的爆发，使得中药材价格进入下行阶段。紧随2008年的行情，在2009年初期中药材价格仍处于低迷状态。随后甲型H1N1流感的爆发，使得具备清热解毒、治疗上呼吸道感染等药材价格开始反弹并不断被推高。以板蓝根、金银花这两种预防治疗感冒的传统中药材价格为例，在2009年1月这两种药材的价格分别为3.7元/千克和72元/千克，到当年底价格已经涨到25元/千克和370元/千克，年内涨幅达到惊人的四五倍（表1），而天南星、薄荷、三七和冬花等中药材在2009年的价格涨幅均超过了2倍。许多中药材价格更是在2009年轻松超越历史最高价。以桔梗为例，其在2009年以前的历史最高价为20元/千克，而在2009年迅速攀升至50元/千克（表2）。而2010年的西南大旱在让中药材供给减少的同时，炒作资金纷涌入市，更是抬高了中药材的价格走势。

中药材价格的暴涨，挤压了制药企业的利润空间，下游药厂的日子尤为艰难。康缘药业在2009年的年报中透露，由于金银花、三七等原辅材料价格上涨明显，导致公司主营业务成本相对前三季度上升了2.22%。属于医药行业的东阿阿胶由于原料价格日益上涨，迫使公司在2010年累计上调产品出厂价高达38%，以此部分转移原料价格上涨对公司的压力。

而与此同时，“新医改”的推出使得中医、中药的应用范围变得更加广泛。2009年9月，国家基本药物目录开始实施，中成药的比重占到了46%，中药饮片也首次被纳入国家基本药物。中国生物技术发展中心的有关报告指出，未来20年中国将加速实现中医药现代化，并形成4000亿元的中医药产业。承受着中药材暴涨压力的众多中药制药企业，在政策示好之下，选择了自建中药材基地作为企业的未来出路。

自行开辟种植基地

进入2010年以来，华南地区最大的单体中药制造生产企业白云山和黄中药动作频频。先是在3月投资5亿元，在云南建立白云山复方丹参片三七原料万亩GAP（Good Agricultural Practices,生产质量管理规范）基地，紧接着于4月23日宣布将在大庆打造5万亩板蓝根GAP基地，通过“科技+农户+企业”的运作模式，鼓励扩大种植规模。预计该基地建成后，年产量可达1万吨，使其成为国内最大的板蓝根生产企业。同时，国内首家中药抗病毒研究中心也在当天正式成立，以流感、禽流感、手足口病、乙型肝炎、艾滋病等全球性病毒性传染病为研究课题，运用现代技术研发具有显著药效的现代化中药。

在“中药复兴”的刺激下，更多企业加大了对中药材种植基地的投入。2009年7月，华润集团旗下的华润医药集团谋求与甘肃中医药企业的合作机会，共同开发中药材种植和深加工。2010年3月，中国医药集团与甘肃省政府签订了战略合作协议，建立中医药材生产加工基地，最终打造现代化物流中心和医药分销网络、特色中医药材生产加工基地。奇正藏药也于近日提出拟投资1.8亿元，在甘肃、陕西建设无公害特色饮片生产基地，把中药饮片及其深加工产业发展作为未来新的利润增长点，进一步构建资源竞争优势。

中药作为典型的资源依赖性产业，原材料的质量和供应量直接关乎企业规模和产品质量。药厂大肆搭建种植基地，以“公司＋基地＋农户”的种植方式克服了以前的小农经营形式，有利于实现规模种植，并加大种植科技含量，提高中药材的种植产量和质量，并解决企业自身对中药材的需求。同时，种植园的开辟也有利于制药企业免受药材价格波动挤压利润空间之苦，最终提升企业自身的竞争力。

4.企业感谢信 篇四

您好！首先，对贵企业一直以来对我们村的福利事业促进和对我公司的农副产品鸡蛋销售的照顾表示衷心的感谢，并致以崇高的敬意！

众所周知贵企业是我们这一地区的大企业，在公司效益、公司管理方面都是名声在外，受到了同行企业，合作单位，以及社会各界人士的一致好评。虽然企业效益年年攀升，实现了跨域式的大发展，但是贵企业并没有得意忘形，忘乎所以，更是加大了人文关怀、公益事业的投资力度，做一个真正的爱心企业。这才是大企业的真正风范，这种爱心精神、发展思路真是让人仰慕和钦佩。给合作企业提供便利，他们有困难的时候都能慷慨解囊，加大投资合作力度；给自己员工发放各种各样的福利，员工也觉得能在这里实现自己的人生价值倍感骄傲和自豪；给困难群体、困难地区提供最大限度的帮助，让一个个冰冷的心灵，重新找回了丝丝暖暖的慰藉。这种事迹还很多很多，我们也都历历在目，共同见证，铭记在心。

我们村是一个贫困问题比较突出的村子，村里基础设施落后，村容村貌比较差，医疗服务、教育水平都需要改善和提高，再加之年轻人为了寻求更好的发展，基本都是外出务工，村里留守儿童成长教育，孤寡、空巢老人需要关怀和照顾。这些问题最直接的解决办法就是加大村里福利的资金投入，让更多的人能够在村里生活的幸福，过上好的生活。有病可医，有饭可吃，有衣服可穿！这些小小的最最基本的愿望，对于他们来说能够实现就是莫大的欣慰。

我们企业仅仅是一个村办养殖企业，其规模程度和管理水平都没法和贵企业相提并论。但是我们和贵企业有着共同的奋斗方向，就是做一个爱心企业。企业盈利微薄，资金有时候周转相当困难，可企业的所有利润基本都是优先考虑用于村里的公益事业。当困难群众含泪接过我们送去的大米等生活必须品；当留守儿童满脸微笑，拿过我们送去的玩具；当学校和医院又多了一些我们送去的关怀。这种感觉胜过了一切，因为我们都看到了我们企业价值的存在。可是我们毕竟是小企业，虽然做的是品质优良的良种鸡蛋，可是客源、市场还是无法广泛打开，销售滞后，效益和利润都没有大的发展。贵公司了解情况以后主动联系我们，做我们的固定客户，购买大量鸡蛋为员工发放福利，一直以来我们受到了很大的帮组和照顾，也间接的帮组了那些困难的群众，他们都铭记在心，我们再次深表感谢！

我们还是希望能够继续保证这种健康的合作模式一直进行下去，也许由于出去贵公司自身发展的情况需要，暂停和我们继续合作，我们也能理解。但是恳请贵公司能给一个缓冲期，我们抵御风险真的很脆弱，鸡蛋卖不出去，鸡就要饿死，更不要谈效益。因为我们接下来村里正计划建立一个幸福院，作为失独，孤寡老人的活动场所，亟待资金解决，也是我们考虑的一个问题。所以再一次恳请贵公司能给予我们多多的照顾，我们也会提供最优质的鸡蛋。

最后，诚祝贵公司事业欣欣向荣，热诚欢迎公司的领导和朋友们来做客，原我们的友谊之树常青！

此致

敬礼

5.企业感谢信 篇五

衷心地感谢你们多年来为我们创造良好的成长环境，衷心地感谢你们呕心沥血的付出，今天，我们终于迈出了成功的第一步，这是我们的光荣，更是母校的光荣!谢谢校领导的关心，感谢所有老师对我们的栽培!没有你们，就没有我们的今天。

几年前，初来乍到国兴中学的我们，只是个懵懂少年，对所有的一切都表现出青春期所特有的困惑与迷茫。是老师，帮我们拨开迷雾，答疑解难，指引了正确的人生方向，从此我们明白了志当存高远的`道理，树立了明确的人生目标。

高一与高二，在我们人生中极为重要的年头里，学校的支持，老师的帮助，家长的呵护，同学的鼓励，让我们坚定了学习和成才的信念，为我们的成功奠定了坚实的基矗在这里，我们满怀信心地憧憬，豪情万丈地起航，最终获得了万里航行中第一步的胜利!

这胜利属于我们，更属于我们的母校——国兴中学!她慈母般地用乳汁哺育着我们，用双手呵护着我们，用话语激励着我们。她为我们提供了丰富多彩的课外兴趣活动，丰富了我们的课余时间。现代化的的教学设施则大大提高了我们的学习效率。幽雅清静的学习环境让我们远离了闹市的喧嚣，使校园里里外外都弥漫着浓浓书香与淡淡花香。十分雄厚的师资力量使我们一次又一次地高奏凯旋的号角，使莘莘学子的知识潜力得到充分的挖掘和彰显————这一切不仅为我们铺平了成长的道路，又让国兴学子平添了几分耀眼的光彩。

此次新加坡企业奖学金项目的成绩，有我们不懈的努力，但自始至终，终究离不开学校的鼎力相助：有陈力校长等学校领导的高度重视，也有各位老师的辛勤付出。试想如果没有国兴中学的滋养，能够有我们今天的成长与进步吗?正如在面试时提到的一样：GuoXing Middle School，is no doubt my second life。我们所取得的成绩与收获，离不开国兴中学老师们一点一滴的耕耘。正是有了学校莫大的帮助，才成了我们力压群雄的壮志，才有了我们勇攀高峰后胜利的呐喊。

我们爱我们的母校，爱我们的国兴中学，无论我们身在何方，我们永远是国兴中学的一份子，永远能骄傲地自豪地对别人说：我是国兴人!我们坚信，不论在哪里，我们将更加刻苦努力的学习，实现个人价值，创造社会财富，争取一切的机会努力报答我们的母校———国兴中学。

6.企业感谢信 篇六

x月x日，受集团公司董事长、总经理的委托，xx同志带队参加了集团公司揭牌仪式和x疗养基地揭牌仪式，得到了市委、市政府的热烈欢迎和盛情接待，令我们万分感动．在此谨向市委、市政府及相关委办局致以衷心的感谢．

作为市工业发展的重要企业，公司的改革和发展始终得到了市委、市政府的高度重视和亲切关怀。市委、市政府及市相关委办局为集团的成立做了大量富有成效的工作，速度快，效率高，令人钦佩．疗养基地的顺利落成同样得到了市委、市政府的深切关怀和大力支持，从疗养基地的规划选址到破土动工，直至顺利落成，市委、市政府及相关委办局都为之付出了艰辛努力，使我们深受鼓舞。

今后，公司将进一步加强与市委、市政府的友好合作。我们坚信，在市委、市政府的关心与支持下，双方的合作之路将会越走越宽阔，我们愿意为地方经济建设和社会进步不断注入新的活力。

再次感谢市委、市政府及各委办局对公司的关心与支持。

7.上游企业感谢信 篇七

An understanding of the interactions between upstream and downstream energy markets has become more and more important to the energy industry,as discussed in many recent studies on topics such as fuel inventory and supply[1], fuel purchase strategies[2],even many regulation policies have been made[3]. The root of these issues is the contradictions between pricing strategies of fuel producers and production strategies of electricity producers. Therefore, understanding the factors like incentives, interactions and strategies are very important to policy makers,the government,fuel and electricity companies,and the others whose interests are highly related with these two energy markets.

These factors depend on interactions in the equilibrium of the electricity market,and are receiving more attentions. Ref.[4] proved the existence of market equilibrium considering the interaction between a fuel dispatcher and generators.Similarly, Refs.[5-6]considered the existence of multiple equilibria.Refs.[7-8]proposed models to show how fuel price affects the production cost of electricity as an exogenous variable.

The descriptions of the impacts of interactions on the market equilibrium are complicated. Therefore, the possibility of using related indices is studied to simplify the description of interactions.Indices are often used to simplify the study and discussion,like consumer product index and industrial production index.The method is also used to simplify the study of impacts on the market equilibrium. Ref.[9]resorted to a set of proper quantitative indices to assess the impacts of demand elasticity on the oligopolistic market.However,the impacts of interactions between fuel and electricity markets on the market equilibrium are not studied thoroughly.

This paper studies the equilibrium between fuel and electricity markets with a new index,called the market incentive index(MI index).A mathematical model vertically linking a monopolistic fuel market and an oligopolistic electricity market is formulated to describe the market we are interested in.The new index provides an intuitionistic view on the impact of interactions on the market equilibrium.In addition,it also provides a method to assess the market incentive on development strategies of electricity producers,which refer to the strategies on the generation capacity.

1 Model and Definition

This section presents a simplified game theoretic model with a monopolistic fuel market and an oligopolistic electricity market,as well as several definitions.The model is simple for representing strategic interactions (game) between the two markets without losing the generality of our conclusions from the qualitative aspect.

1.1 Model Description

Since the fuel cost is a dominant factor that alters strategies of electricity producers when the fuel price changes,we only consider the fuel cost.The cost function for each electricity producer is:

where Fe(Qi)is the cost function of electricity producer i; Pfuelthe fuel price;Qithe output of electricity producer i; and Hithe heat rate of electricity producer i,if the producer i is a fuel-independent producer,like renewable producer, its heat rate is zero.

The object of the monopolistic fuel producer is to maximize its profit by choosing the optimal fuel price as:

whereπfuel(Pfuel)is the profit function of the fuel producer; Sfuel the total fuel supply;Dfuel (Qi )the fuel demand function of electricity producer i;ffuel the marginal fuel production cost;and I the set of electricity producers.

The inverse demand curve of the downstream electricity market takes a simple linear form as:

where Deis the total electrical demand;andθ andρ are coefficients.

The goal of each electricity producer is to maximize its profit assuming that its rivals keep their outputs constant. Thus,their behaviors can be summarized as:

where Ciis the capacity constraint on electricity producer i.

The above behavior model implies that electricity producer i knows the quantities produced by the electricity producer j ≠i, the fuel producer knows all the electricity quantities,and each electricity producer knows the fuel price.

1.2 Definition

Several definitions are presented to assist the analysis in this study.

1)The first best choice is the best choice for an electricity producer decided in the situation ignoring its capacity limit.

2)Objective fuel price(OP)is the optimal fuel price in the fuel market set by the fuel producer responding to the overall fuel demand of fuel-dependent electricity producers.

3)Subjective fuel price(SP)is the expected fuel price for an electricity producer whose first best choice just equals to its capacity.If the capacity is zero,the SP is called the threshold fuel price(TP),which represents the lowest fuel price to make the electricity producer willing to access the market.

4)Capacity change rate (CCR)is the normalized optimal capacity change level of the electricity producer.This can measure the incentive on electricity producers to change its capacity in the market equilibrium.

5)High efficiency generation technology is a kind of generation technology with a low heat rate.In the model setting of this paper,the level of producing efficiency refers to its relevant heat rate compared with other electricity producers. We consider the rest of electricity producers except electricity producer j as the hypothetical electricity producers(expressed as j-1).If Hj<0.5 Hj -1 ,the electricity producer j applies the high efficiency generation technology.

6)Low efficiency generation technology is a kind of generation technology with a high heat rate.Opposite to the high efficiency generation technology,if Hj>0.5 Hj -1 ,the electricity producer j applies the low efficiency generation technology.

7)MI index is the normalized difference between OP and SP where the benchmark is the difference between SP and TP.The difference between OP and SP is also called the price gap for short in this paper.The definition of the MI index is described as:

whereηiis the MI index for electricity producer i;PfO uelthe objective fuel price;PiS (Ci)the subjective fuel price for electricity producer i when its capacity is Ci;and PiS (0)its threshold fuel price.

2 Market Equilibrium

The market equilibrium with three lemmas are studies, and interaction relationships between the two markets are explained.Particularly,the last lemma can explain how the MI index represents the incentive on development strategies of electricity producers in the market equilibrium.These lemmas are bases of the further study on the market equilibrium in section 4.

In order to simplify our study, we treat the other producers except producer j as the hypothetical producers (expressed as j-1).Since electricity producers always withhold their capacities in an oligopoly market,we assume that the hypothetical producer j-1 has adequate capacity to produce electricity.

2.1 Relationships Between Fuel Prices and the Generation Capacity

We only consider the situation that the capacity of producer j is binding.This is because when its capacity is not binding,changes at the capacity level cannot affect the market equilibrium. Lemma 1 shows the relationships between fuel prices and the generation capacity in the binding situation.

Lemma 1:In the proposed market framework,when producer j is binding,the relationships between fuel prices and the generation capacity depend on the technology applied.

1)If producer j uses the high efficiency generation technology,its subjective fuel price is monotonously increased with its capacity level,while the objective fuel price is monotonously decreased with its capacity level.

2)If producer j uses the low efficiency generation technology,its subjective fuel price is monotonously decreased with its capacity level,while the objective fuel price is monotonously increased with its capacity level.

For example,the relationships in the model setting of this paper can be described as:

where

Note that,when the electricity producer j uses the high efficiency generation technology (Hj<0.5 Hj-1 ),a1is positive and a3is negative;while,when it applies the low efficiency generation technology (Hj>0.5 Hj-1 ),a1is negative and a3 is positive. The detailed deduction is presented in Appendix A.

2.2 Relationship Between the Price Gap and the Optimal Development Strategy

If the capacity level is too low or too high compared with its first best choice,electricity producer j will suffer profit loss. Once this happens, the electricity producer is motivated to adjust its capacity to reach a new optimal level so that its capacity equals to its first best choice.Lemma 2 shows the relationship between the price gap and the optimal change of generation capacity.

Lemma 2:In the proposed market framework,the relationship between the price gap and the optimal change of generation capacity depends on the technology applied.

1)If producer j uses the high efficiency generation technology,the price gap positively and monotonously reflects its optimal adjustment at the capacity level in both situations,that is,the capacity of producer j is binding and not binding.

2)If producer j uses the low efficiency generation technology,the price gap negatively and monotonously reflects its optimal adjustment at the capacity level in both situations,that is,the capacity of producer j is binding and not binding.

For example,the relationship in the model setting of this paper is:

whereΔCj* is the optimal adjustment at the capacity level for producer j;a1and(a1-a3)can be proved as negative.

Note that,negative capacity adjustment does not mean that the electricity producer should cut its capacity in reality. It indicates that its capacity is overcapitalized.Therefore, the electricity producer should withhold its production in spite of suffering investment loss. The deduction of Lemma 2is presented in Appendix B.

2.3 Relationship Between the MI Index and CCR

The incentive on electricity producers is studied by analyzing the relationship between the MI index and CCR, which is shown in Lemma 3.

Lemma 3:In the proposed market framework,the MI index positively and monotonously indicates the optimal CCR of the electricity producer j in both situations,that is,its capacity is binding and not binding.

For example,the relationship in the model setting of this paper is:

whereηjis the MI index of electricity producer j;ΔCj* /Cj the CCR;it is obvious that(1-a3/a1)is positive no matter what technology producer j applied.The detailed deduction is presented in Appendix C.

Since CCR is a relevant variable that reflects the degree of the incentive on a electricity producer to change its capacity in the market equilibrium,this lemma shows that the MI index can be used to explain the incentive on electricity producers.For example,when the MI index is positive,a larger CCR means that the incentive in the market equilibrium of allowing the electricity producer to expand its capacity is stronger.

3 Illustrative Examples

Results of numerical examples are provided to further explain the lemmas.

3.1 Market Structure

There are three hypothetical electricity producers using different generation technologies in the electricity market. Producer A is a fuel-independent electricity producer operating renewable generators;producer B is a fuel-dependent electricity producer operating old generators with the highest heat rate;producer C is also a fuel-dependent electricity producer but operating new generators with a lower heat rate than producer B.As producer A is the fuel-independent electricity producer whose heat rate is zero,it can satisfy the condition of the high efficiency generation technology;while,as producer C has the highest heat rate,it can satisfy the condition of the low efficiency generation technology.The technologies applied by electricity producers A and C cover all technologies, therefore,we only present simulation results of electricity producers A and C. An exhaustion method is used to simulate the game between the upstream fuel market and the downstream electricity market,and simulation data are presented in Appendix D.

3.2 Simulation Results

The simulation results shown in Fig.1 illustrate the relationships between capacity levels of electricity producers and fuel prices.Fig.1(a)shows that the objective fuel price is monotonously decreased with the capacity level of producer A applying the high efficiency generation technology,while its subjective fuel price is monotonously increased with its capacity level,which is the idea of the first point of Lemma 1;Fig.1(b)shows that the objective fuel price is monotonously increased with the capacity level of producer C applying the low efficiency generation technology,while its subjective fuel price is monotonously decreased with its capacity level,which is the idea of the second point of Lemma 1.

The simulation results shown in Fig.2 illustrate the relationships between the optimal adjustments at capacity levels and in the price gaps for electricity producers. Fig.2(a)and (b)show that the price gaps are all monotonously increased with the optimal adjustment at the capacity level of producer A applying the high efficiency generation technology in both situations,that is,its capacity is binding and not binding,which is the idea of the first point of Lemma 2.Fig.2(c)and (d)show that the price gap is monotonously decreased with the optimal adjustment at the capacity level of producer C applying the low efficiency generation technology in both situations,that is,its capacity is binding and not binding,which is the idea of the second point of Lemma 2.

The simulation results shown in Fig.3 illustrate the relationship between CCR and the MI index.As Lemma 3 satisfies a producer with any type of technology,we take producer C as an example to show this relationship. Fig.3(a)and(b)show that the MI index is monotonously increased with CCR in both situations,that is,the capacity of producer C is binding and not binding,which is the idea of Lemma 3.

4 Market Equilibrium Based on the MI Index

Features of the market equilibrium are studied and classified by the sign of the MI index.

Analysis 1:In the market with our framework,the market equilibrium with a positive MI index has the following common features.

1)There is an incentive on electricity producer j to expand its capacity level for producing more electricity and the degree of the incentive is increased with the MI index.

2)The optimal output of electricity producer j is not its first best choice and it is physically limited in the market equilibrium.

3)The incentive on electricity producer j can affect the market equilibrium.

Analysis 2:In the market with our framework,the market equilibrium with a zero MI index has the following common features.

1)There is no incentive on electricity producer j to change its capacity level.It strategically withholds its production at its capacity level.

2)The optimal output of electricity producer j is its first best choice and it is at the constrained edge in the market equilibrium.

3)There is no incentive on electricity producer j to change the market equilibrium.

Analysis 3:In the market with our framework,the market equilibrium with a negative MI index has the following common features.

1)There is an incentive on electricity producer j to shrink its capacity because its capacity is overcapitalized. The degree of the incentive is increased with the absolute value of the MI index.

2)The optimal output of electricity producer j is its first best choice but it is lower than its capacity level in the market equilibrium.

3)The incentive on electricity producer j cannot affect the market equilibrium.

The above analyses can be easily explained by the lemmas. We provide an explanation of Analysis 1as an example. With a similar method,other analyses can be explained.

When the MI index is positive,according to Lemma 3, there is an incentive on the electricity producer to expand its capacity,which is the idea of the first point of Analysis 1.If ignoring its capacity,the electricity producer should choose a larger output,so its optimal output is lower than its first best choice,which is the idea of the second point of Analysis 1.When the electricity producer changes its capacity,it will result in a new fuel price according to Lemma 1.In other words,the market equilibrium will move to a new statue, which is the idea of the third point of Analysis 1.

The above analyses summarize market equilibriums with the MI index.Analysis results show that the market features in the equilibrium can be summarized and represented with simple indices like the MI index.Besides,it also provides a method to compare the market incentives on development strategies of electricity producers.

5 Conclusions

This paper introduces a new index,called the MI index as well as an index-based method for studying the equilibrium between fuel and electricity markets.In order to derive out the MI index,we study the market equilibrium,in which the interaction relationships between the two markets are explained analytically with three lemmas and demonstrated with numerical examples.The findings for the three lemmas are explained in the following.

1)In a binding situation, fuel prices have fixed relationships with the generation capacity,which is highly dependent on the generation technology. For a given electricity producer with a fixed generation technology,SP and OP have opposite relationships with respect to the generation capacity.

2)The optimal development strategies of electricity producers can be understood by the price gap,i.e.,the sign of the price gap reflects the direction of capacity adjustment and its absolute value reflects the amount of capacity,thus the electricity producer should change. However,such relationships also rely on the technology that the electricity producer applied.

3)The MI index has a strong relationship with CCR,and such relationships truly reflect the incentives less sensitive to the generation technology.

Based on the three lemmas,we further study the market equilibrium with the MI index.The results show that the MI index not only can describe the incentives on market participants in the equilibrium,but also can reveal more features of the market equilibrium.

Furthermore,the above analyses suggest that even for the very complicated interactions between fuel producers and electricity producers, some insights on the market equilibrium can be easily developed and summarized by simple indices like MI index in this paper.Besides,although the complicated interactions have complicated impact on the market equilibriums,the degree of the impact can be intuitively explained by indices.